A commentary on al-Yazdī's gloss on al-Taftāzānī's Tahdhīb al-manṭiq wa-al-kalām; logic, Arabic logic; early works to 1800.

Vaishnava philosophical work, in verse; critically edited.

Given the centrality of English as a Foreign Language students’ wellbeing in their academic success, identifying factors that may be influential in fostering students’ well-being is of high importance. As such, several studies have delved into the role of various personal and interpersonal factors in increasing EFL students’ well-being. However, little attention has been devoted to the function of teacher-student rapport. Besides, no systematic or theoretical review has been conducted in this regard. To address these gaps, the present study intends (...) to illustrate different definitions of student well-being and teacher-student rapport, their sub-components, and their theoretical relations. Building upon the theoretical and empirical bases, the facilitative function of teacher-student rapport in increasing EFL students’ well-being was proved. Some beneficial implications are also discussed. (shrink)

Many domains, notably the one involving predicates of personal taste, present the phenomenon of apparent faultless disagreement. Contextualism is a characteristically moderate implementation of the relativistic attempt to endorse such appearances. According to an often-voiced objection, although it straightforwardly accounts for the faultlessness, contextualism fails to respect “facts about disagreement.” With many other recent contributors to the debate, I contend that the notion of disagreement—“genuine,” “real,” “substantive,” “robust” disagreement—is indeed very flexible, and in particular can be constituted by contrasting attitudes. (...) As such, contextualism is clearly straightforwardly compatible with facts about the existence of disagreement. There is, however, a genuine prima facie worry for contextualism involving facts about the expression of disagreement in ordinary conversations. Elaborating on a suggestion by Lewis :113–138, 1989), I argue that the presupposition of commonality approach in López de Sa shows that there are versions of contextualism that are in good standing vis-à-vis such facts about the expression of disagreement. (shrink)

According to the simple proposal about rigidity for predicates, a predicate is rigid (roughly) if it signifies the same property across the relevant worlds. Recent critics claim that this suffers from a trivialization problem: any predicate whatsoever would turn out to be trivially rigid, according to the proposal. In this paper a corresponding "problem" for ordinary singular terms is considered. A natural solution is provided by intuitions concerning the actual truth-value of identity statements involving them. The simple proposal for predicates (...) is then defended, by exploiting corresponding intuitions concerning statements involving their nominalizations, in an analogous manner. (shrink)

On the philosophy of education and views of Aurobindo Ghose, 1872-1950; articles.

L'Althusser antihumaniste, ou de la coupure: Le problème de la "philosophie de Marx" -- Du côté de Staline -- Les thèses de l'antihumanisme -- Spinoza l'antihumaniste -- Louis Althusser entre déterminisme et liberté -- Althusser de la lecture: Le détour par Spinoza -- Le Traité théologico-politique, une politique du discours -- Lire Le Capital avec Spinoza -- Althusser de la structure: Du "marxisme structuraliste" à l'immanentisme spinoziste : un parcours philosophique -- Déterminisme et coupures -- Coupure et lecture symptômale -- (...) Althusser, de la conjoncture au retour du sujet: Penser la conjoncture -- Le détour par Machiavel -- Spinoza Machiavellianus -- Interpellation et constitution du sujet -- Est-il simple d'être spinoziste en philosophie? -- Althusser et l'aléatoire: -- Entre la nécessité et l'aléatoire -- La crise du marxisme -- Les "manifestes" du matérialisme aléatoire -- À quoi s'oppose le matérialisme aléatoire? -- Une conjoncture sans politique. (shrink)

Estudio comparado entre México y España, que desde la perspectiva de las ciencias del Derecho y la Bioética, aborda el tema de la voluntad anticipada, la cual consiste en la posibilidad que tienen las personas para tomar decisiones con relación a su vida, salud, cuidados y muerte, específicamente en casos relacionados con la muerte encefálica, el estado vegetativo y la eutanasia. Asimismo, el autor analiza aspectos médicos, filosóficos, biológicos, clínicos, éticos y morales vinculados con este tema.

Study on Brahmasūtrārthadarśinī, a commentary by Ananta Dāmodara Āṭhavale on Brahmasūtra by Bādarāyaṇa, work on Vedanta philosophy.

Study on Brahmasūtrārthadarśinī, a commentary by Ananta Dāmodara Āṭhavale on Brahmasūtra by Bādarāyaṇa, work on Vedanta philosophy.

Classical work on Jaina philosophy; critical edition with Hindi translation.

In this paper, I propose a new nonconceptual reading of the B-Deduction. As Hanna correctly remarks :399–415, 2011: 405), the word “cognition” has in both editions of the first Critique a wide sense, meaning nonconceptual cognition, and a narrow meaning, in Kant’s own words “an objective perception”. To be sure, Kant assumes the first meaning to account for why the Deduction is unavoidable. And if we take this meaning as a premise of the B-Deduction, then there is a gap in (...) the argument since the categories are certainly not conditions for non-conceptual cognition. Still, I believe it is not this wide meaning but rather the narrow one that figures in any premise of the B-Deduction. Thus, in the reading that I am proposing, categories are not conditions for representing something, or even conditions for representing something objectively. Instead, they are conditions for the recognition that what we represent through the senses exists mind-independently. In the first step of the B-Deduction, this cognition in the narrow sense takes the form of the propositional thinking that the nonconceptually represented object of the sensible intuition exists objectively. In contrast, in the second step of the B-Deduction, this cognition in the narrow sense takes the form of the apprehension of what our human senses represent nonconceptually as existing objectively. (shrink)

Grammatical gender processing during language production has classically been studied using the so-called picture-word interference (PWI) task. In this procedure, participants are presented with pictures they must name using target nouns while ignoring superimposed written distractor nouns. Variations in response times are expected depending on the congruency between the gender values of targets and distractors. However, there have been disparate results in terms of the mandatory character of an agreement context to observe competitive gender effects and the interpretation of the (...) direction of these effects in Romance languages, this probably due to uncontrolled variables such as animacy. In the present study, we conducted two PWI experiments with European Portuguese speakers who were asked to produce bare nouns. The percentage of animate targets within the list was manipulated: 0, 25, 50, and 100%. A gender congruency effect was found restricted to the 0% list (all targets were inanimate). Results support the selection of gender in transparent languages in the absence of an agreement context, as predicted by the Gender Acquisition and Processing (GAP) hypothesis (Sá-Leite et al.,2019), and are interpreted through the attentional mechanisms involved in the PWI paradigm, in which the processing of animate targets would be favored to the detriment of distractors due to biological relevance and semantic prioritization. (shrink)

This book argues for the use of nonideal theory in social ontology. The central claim is that a paradigm shift is underway in contemporary social ontology, from ideal to nonideal, and that this shift should be fully followed through. To develop and defend this central claim, the first step is to show that the key questions and central dividing lines within contemporary social ontology can be fruitfully reconstructed as a clash between two worlds, referred to as ideal and nonideal social (...) ontology. Ideal social ontology is characterized by consensus and cooperation, while nonideal social ontology is characterized by conflict and contestation. The second step is to show that, when taken together, objections to the standard model of ideal social ontology (the dominant version of ideal social ontology) imply that this model needs to be given up in favor of nonideal social ontology. In other words, we should look to nonideal rather than ideal social ontology for core concepts. The third step is to offer a positive account, called the power view, of nonideal social ontology. This account places the concept of social power at the core of a general theory of the social world and replaces the flat and narrow conception of power in ideal social ontology with a richer and more extensive conception. In addition, it rectifies a shortcoming in nonideal social ontology by attending to class, which has been notably and oddly overlooked in the literature. (shrink)